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Discrepancy between insurance theory
and the Dutch supplementary insurance
A vast amount of traditional economic literature [e.g. 2, 13,
20] describes the advantages and disadvantages of taking out
health insurance. The major advantage of insurance is the
reduction of uncertainty regarding financial losses [12]. The
welfare gain from this uncertainty reduction depends on the
individual’s degree of risk aversion [14], which is affected by
the presence of background risks (i.e. risks that cannot be
avoided or insured against, such as labour income risks).
Several studies show that background risks to wealth makes
risk averse individuals behave in a more risk averse way with
respect to any other independent risk [e.g. 5]. This concept is
called risk vulnerability [8], and causes insured to reduce their
exposure to avoidable risks, for instance by increasing their
insurance demand [9]. Another advantage of health insurance
is that it provides access to healthcare services that would
otherwise be unaffordable [12]. The disadvantages of insur-
ance are moral hazard, the loading fee and the transaction
costs related to purchasing the insurance and handling the
claims. The literature shows that full insurance is far from
optimal and that a mix between coverage and cost sharing is
preferred. Optimal designs of health insurance (1) protect
individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, (2)
provide access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services,
(3) include first-dollar cost sharing, and (4) incorporate
individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses [4] (see Table 1).
In practice, however, insurance design does not always
comply with these principles. An obvious example concerns
the Dutch supplementary health insurance (SHI). As we will
explain below, the Dutch SHI substantially deviates from the
optimal design. It is therefore surprising to observe the pop-
ularity of this scheme: 84 %of theDutch insured took out SHI
in 2015. This intriguing paradox suggests that additional
aspects––compared to those mentioned in the traditional
economic literature––may play a role in the demand for health
insurance. After a short description of the Dutch SHI, we will
discuss a series of potential explanations for the high uptake of
‘‘suboptimal’’ insurance stemming from key insights descri-
bed in the behavioural economic literature.
Dutch insured can buy a SHI for healthcare services not
(or partially) covered by mandatory basic health insurance
(BHI), such as dental care, physiotherapy, durable medical
equipment, alternative medicines, pharmaceuticals, care
consumed in a foreign country, orthodontics and maternity
care. The Dutch SHI market is a free market, which means
that insurers are free to determine the premiums, coverage
and cost sharing arrangements. The risk reduction resulting
from the Dutch SHI is limited because most healthcare
services covered do not involve large losses, and because
coverage limits are applied (see Table 1). The latter
implies that, after the limit is reached, all expenses have to
be paid out-of-pocket by the insured, which––in case of
care consumed in a foreign country or dental care after an
accident, for example––could lead to substantial out-of-
pocket expenses. Next to the limited risk reduction, the
Dutch SHI mostly provides access to already affordable
healthcare services such as dental check-ups and regular
consultations with the physiotherapist. These characteris-
tics suggest that the consumers’ welfare gain from Dutch
SHI may be limited. At the same time the consumers’
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welfare loss may be substantial due to the loading fee
(about 17 % of the premium), moral hazard, and transac-
tion costs. Substantial moral hazard can be expected,
because most healthcare services are subject to first-dollar
coverage, while substantial transaction costs could arise
since many insurers offer many different SHI policies,
making the choice of SHI time consuming.
In sum, the discrepancies in Table 1 show that the design
of theDutch SHI is opposite towhat the traditional economic
theory on optimal insurance design would predict. Never-
theless, all Dutch insurers offer these kinds of SHI policies,
and many Dutch insured actually take out one or more of
these SHI policies. An explanation of the high uptake of the
Dutch SHI could be that Dutch insured are extremely risk
averse, implying that the consumer welfare gain from risk
reduction could still outweigh the substantial welfare loss
from moral hazard, the loading fee and transaction costs. If
this were true, however, one would expect (much) higher
coverage limits than applied in theDutch SHI, since the gains
from financial risk reduction would then be even larger than
under the current design. Furthermore, an increase in risk
aversion due to background risk could explain the high
uptake of the SHI. However, we consider it highly unlikely
that there is substantial background risk that could have
affected the demand for SHI in the last decade for over 84 %
of theDutch individuals. After all, the Dutch have significant
social security such as child allowances, social welfare
payments, comprehensive social health insurance, disability
insurance and state pensions. In this editorial we will discuss
two alternative explanations for the high uptake of ‘‘subop-
timal’’ insurance.
Behavioural economics
Key insights from behavioural economics may help explain
the demand for health insurance. We provide two potential
explanations: (1) other key aspects stemming from beha-
vioural economics other than risk reduction, and access to
otherwise unaffordable healthcare services provide a
welfare gain to individuals when taking out SHI; and/or (2)
insured make suboptimal choices.
Potential aspects that provide a welfare gain
from taking out SHI
Loss aversion
A first potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain to
insured when taking out SHI is loss aversion, which is a
key insight from the ‘cumulative prospect theory’ devel-
oped by Tversky and Kahneman [18]. Loss aversion
regards the phenomenon that ‘losses loom larger than
gains’ and that ‘the aggravation that one experiences in
losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount’ [11].
Research concerning loss aversion and insurance decisions
has been done in the past [e.g. 10, 16], but not regarding
SHI. Loss aversion plays a role only in mixed prospects
(i.e. where the outcome of a prospect is either a gain or a
loss). In such mixed prospects, the presence of loss aver-
sion depends upon the individuals’ reference point: pro-
spects coded as losses from this reference point are affected
by loss aversion. It is often assumed that the current state of
wealth is the reference point in any decision. Subsequently,
the taken reference point concerning the decision to take
out SHI (i.e. either SHI or no SHI) is essential to the effect
of loss aversion. When taking out SHI (especially via the
internet), Dutch insurers guide individuals through the
different choices they have to make: which BHI, which
deductible level and which SHI to apply for. With respect
to the choice of the SHI, some insurers attach virtual labels
to one of the offered policies stating ‘most commonly
chosen (in your situation)’, nudging insured to take out SHI
by carefully setting the default option. Next to the fact that
most insured already had SHI in the previous year (i.e. their
current state of wealth), this might additionally provide
individuals with a reference point equal to having a SHI.
From this reference point, an aversion to potential out-of-
pocket expenses for healthcare services not covered by SHI
Table 1 Characteristics of health insurance design: ‘‘optimal’’ versus the Dutch supplementary health insurance (SHI)
Characteristic Optimal insurance design Dutch SHI
1 What does the insurance provide
protection against and what does it
provide access to?
Unpredictable high financial risks
and otherwise unaffordable
healthcare services
Mostly predictable low financial risks (e.g. dental check-ups
and consultations at the physiotherapist). Some SHIs
provide protection against large expenses, but these are
mostly maximised (e.g. dental expenses after an accident
(up to about €10,000), care consumed in a foreign country)
2 Is cost sharing applied and if so, how? Yes, in the form of first-dollar cost
sharing
No, except only dental insurances apply coinsurance of
20–25 %
3 Are caps on out-of-pocket expenses
applied and if so, how?
Yes, in the form of an individual
cap
No, after the coverage limits (e.g. nine treatments at a
physiotherapist) are reached, insured pay the full expenses
for healthcare services out-of-pocket
654 K. P. M. van Winssen et al.
123
(i.e. in case of not taking out SHI) could be created and a
preference for the status quo (i.e. having SHI) could arise.
This would imply that in the presence of loss aversion, the
welfare gain from taking out SHI would be higher than in
the absence of loss aversion.
Ambiguity aversion
A second potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain
from taking out SHI is ambiguity aversion (sometimes also
referred to as uncertainty aversion). Ambiguity aversion
captures individuals’ preference for prospects with known
probabilities over prospects with unknown probabilities
and was first presented by Ellsberg [6]. In a hypothetical
experiment, individuals were confronted with two urns.
The first urn contained 100 red and black balls in an
unknown ratio and the second urn contained exactly 50 red
and 50 black balls. The majority of respondents preferred
to bet on either red or black in urn two rather than in urn
one, although the expected outcome for both urns was the
same, indicating ambiguity aversion. Missing information
that is relevant and could be known creates the uncertainty
about probabilities. From ambiguity aversion it then fol-
lows that individuals will value provision of any informa-
tion that reduces their ambiguity, even if it will not change
their decision, while standard economic theory predicts that
the demand for information depends on its value in making
decisions. When deciding to take out SHI, ambiguity
aversion might create a preference for taking out SHI. This
is caused by the fact that uncertainty (or ambiguity) is
present regarding the choice option of not taking out SHI.
After all, insured do not know (and are bad at estimating)
their probability that healthcare expenses occur that could
have been covered by SHI. With SHI this type of ambiguity
is absent and could therefore provide a welfare gain.
Liquidity constraints
Liquidity constraints are a third potential aspect that may
provide a welfare gain from taking out SHI to insured.
Liquidity constraints imply that individuals do not have the
financial possibilities to free up an (substantial) amount of
money at some point in time. For instance, if individuals do
not take out SHI, but unexpectedly need several treatments
from a healthcare provider that are not covered by BHI,
they might not be able to pay the bill they receive. This
might be due to the fact that they are financially illiquid.
Since this situation could be prevented, at least for
healthcare services that are covered by SHI, individuals
might be more inclined to take out SHI. Of course, indi-
viduals then have to pay a (additional) monthly premium
but they prevent the unpleasant situation where they cannot
pay a large bill (or even forego care) due to liquidity
constraints. This would imply that in the presence of liq-
uidity aversion, the welfare gain from taking out SHI
would be higher than in the absence of liquidity aversion.
Debt aversion
A fourth potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain
from taking out SHI is debt aversion. Debt aversion stems
from mental accounting theory [17] and is shown by
individuals’ preference to prepay for consumption and to
get paid for work after completion. Essentially, individuals
dislike the feeling of ‘having the meter running’. A phe-
nomenon called the flat rate bias indicates that individuals
prefer flat-rate pricing schemes even if they pay more for
the same usage. Debt aversion is explained by two motives:
(1) individuals hope to enjoy the product or service
untroubled from payment concerns, and (2) individuals
want to avoid the unpleasant experience of paying for
consumption that has been enjoyed already. So, debt
aversion predicts that insured prefer flat-rate pricing
schemes (e.g. BHI or SHI), and dislike paying for health-
care after consumption. After all, with SHI, healthcare
services (up to a maximum) do not have to be paid after
usage, but are prepaid through a monthly flat rate. Without
SHI, the individual receives the bill after usage of the
healthcare service, which is not preferred as a result of debt
aversion. This would imply that, in the presence of debt
aversion, the welfare gain from taking out SHI would be
higher than in the absence of debt aversion.
Making a suboptimal choice
An alternative explanation for the high uptake of SHI in the
Netherlands is that a large number of insured make sub-
optimal choices due to several behavioural economic
aspects, meaning that individuals take out SHI while the-
oretically not taking out SHI would be ‘optimal’.1,2
1 Note that, if insured want coverage for healthcare services not
covered by BHI, their only option is the current SHI since no better
alternative SHI policies are offered at the Dutch SHI market. One
could question why insurers do not offer alternative SHI policies that
are more in line with traditional economics. Firstly, this might be due
to the fact that other aspects provide a welfare gain to individuals that
may affect the decision to take out SHI. Consequently, there might be
no need (and no demand) for alternative policies. Secondly, such
alternative policies would imply a tendency towards equivalence (i.e.
risk rating and risk selection) at the SHI market. However, Dutch
society demands solidarity even for healthcare services offered at the
free SHI market. A potential fear of reputation loss might therefore
prevent insurers from offering such policies.
2 Note that not all insured make a suboptimal choice when taking out
SHI. Some insured may buy SHI because they know they will
financially profit from it. Nonetheless, 30 % of the Dutch insured with
SHI did not file any bills to their insurer for reimbursement in 2013.
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Limited knowledge
A first potential aspect that could indicate why insured
make a suboptimal choice when taking out SHI may be
individuals’ limited knowledge regarding SHI policies.
After all, insured are known to have limited knowledge
about their health insurance [15] and to misunderstand
complex price schedules including premiums and cost
sharing arrangements [3]. Dutch individuals, for instance,
do not know what type of health policy they have and are
ignorant with respect to aspects such as deductibles, cov-
erage and healthcare providers covered. There are two
reasons why it could be expected that limited knowledge
indeed affects the insured’s decision regarding SHI. Firstly,
it could be expected that insured do not (exactly) know
what they insure against by taking out SHI. Insured could,
for instance, not know which benefits are covered and
which coverage limits and cost sharing arrangements
apply. They might feel like they insure unpredictable and
large potential losses, but might be unaware that they are
(also) insuring regular dental check-ups. Secondly, it could
be expected that insured do not know the costs of health-
care services that are (not) covered by insurance. This
makes it hard for insured to make their own trade-off
between the premium for SHI and the healthcare services
covered by SHI, potentially causing them to make a sub-
optimal choice. Additionally, making this trade-off might
be complex and might impose a high cognitive burden.
This could especially be the case for individuals with low
levels of numeracy and/or health literacy.
Social comparison
A second potential aspect that could explain why insured
take out SHI regards social comparison [7], where imita-
tion is the most frequent form of peer effect. A norm to
conform to the peer (e.g. family and friends) may explain
why peer choices, and thus social comparison, indeed
matters. Individuals reflect upon what their peers decide
and might think ‘if my peers are purchasing insurance, I
should purchase insurance for myself as well’. The beha-
viour of peers might potentially affect the decision to take
out SHI as well: ‘if many of my friends and family take out
SHI, I will do too, but if almost nobody takes out insurance,
I am also not going to take out SHI’. As long as many
insured take out SHI, social comparison could potentially
explain why many insured take out SHI.
Decision avoidance
Decision avoidance is a third potential aspect that could
indicate why insured make a suboptimal choice concerning
their SHI. Decision avoidance implies a tendency to avoid
making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an easy
way out that involves no action or no change [1]. Several
underlying factors could contribute to decision avoidance.
Firstly, a reluctance to take action to change the current
state (i.e. omission bias) could result in decision avoidance.
Due to this omission bias, insured may automatically renew
their current health insurance policy, which mostly
includes a SHI. A second underlying factor regards choice
and information overload. Research in both economics and
psychology questions whether more choice is always in the
consumer’s interest. Particularly when choice involves
health and money––both part of the decision to take out
SHI––consumers facing many choices may revert to the
status quo even if superior options are available. With
respect to the Dutch SHI, many different insurers offer
many different types of insurances, with different benefit
packages, for different premiums, with different cost
sharing arrangements and reimbursement maximums. This
could cause the individual to be overwhelmed by too much
choice and subsequently make the insured defer the choice
and eventually not make any decision at all. A third
underlying factor of decision avoidance regards search and
transaction costs. Consumer search is costly and a rational
consumer will search until the cost of additional searching
outweighs its expected benefits. Transaction and search
costs, with respect to the SHI, regard the time and effort it
takes for an individual to determine whether or not to take
out SHI and, if so, which SHI to take out. Search and
transaction costs might be very high since insured have
many decisions and trade-offs to make regarding their SHI.
This could, again, cause insured to automatically renew
their current health insurance policy. A fourth underlying
factor of decision avoidance regards regret avoidance,
which implies that whenever choice can induce regret,
individuals have a tendency to eliminate the choice. Regret
avoidance helps explain individuals’ preference for first-
dollar coverage, since many individuals find decisions that
involve a trade-off between healthcare and money
unpleasant. Consequently, insured (again) might take out
SHI, because they may regret not taking out SHI if
healthcare expenses do occur and have to be paid for out-
of-pocket while it would, in retrospect, have been finan-
cially profitable to take out SHI. In sum, decision avoid-
ance could cause insured to make suboptimal choices
regarding their SHI.
Further research
It should be emphasised that the behavioural economic
aspects presented in this editorial are potential explanations
for the observed behaviour. Further (empirical) research is
needed to determine whether, and to what extent, the
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potential extensions to the theory on optimal insurance
design, and the ideas on consumer choice, hold true in
practice. We see at least five directions for further research.
Firstly, research could be performed regarding the question
whether insured with an insurance policy in the current
year indeed are more inclined to take out insurance in the
next year (correcting for health status and other back-
ground characteristics such as gender, age and social eco-
nomic status). In this way, the potential effect of loss
aversion and decision avoidance on the demand for insur-
ance could be tested. Secondly, research could study the
effect of providing insight into the probability of using
healthcare services covered by health insurance on the
decision to take out insurance, such as that done by Wakker
et al. [19]. Such a study could look into the aspects of
ambiguity aversion, limited knowledge and social com-
parison. Thirdly, it could be interesting to perform a dis-
crete choice experiment with respect to design aspects of
health insurance, to see which aspects insured value most
and what an optimal insurance design would look like to
them. Fourthly, research could study the effect of provision
of information about health insurance (i.e. what does it
cover, what cost sharing arrangements apply, etc.) on the
decision to take out insurance. This could provide insights
regarding the direct effect of information on the demand
for insurance. Fifthly, it would be important to study how
the different research areas presented in this editorial (i.e.
traditional economics versus behavioural economics) relate
to each other. For instance, Gollier and Pratt [8] show that
adding a background risk to an individual’s initial wealth
makes him desire a certain lottery, which he disliked before
the background risk was added. This seems quite similar to
what Kahneman and Tversky [11] present in their paper
when they add a 1000 to an individual’s initial wealth and
show that the answer to the same lottery reverses. Both
these results may relate to an individual’s reference point
when making (insurance) decisions, and could provide a
better understanding of insurance demand. The mentioned
directions for further research could contribute to better
insurance designs and could help facilitate the insured’s
decision-making process.
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